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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT : DCI Report on the Community to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

REFERENCE : Memorandum to DDS&T from D/DCI/NIPE, dated 27 August 1968, same subject

1. In response to your request for Directorate comments on "Coordination of the US Foreign Intelligence Effort" considered under three general categories: (a) Major problems, (b) Gaps, deficiencies, and undesirable duplication, and (c) Recommended actions, the following are submitted by DDS&T:

*Remitten*

A. Major Problems Existing in the Coordination of the Intelligence Community.

The major problem here is that Departmental policies affect both current intelligence and estimates.

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While we could not reasonably expect policy to be divorced from intelligence, we feel that there is too much blind subservience to a policy by individuals at the working level in DOD, with the result that they are often neither free to compromise positions nor willing to advise their superiors to change a position, when new evidence makes it perfectly clear that these things should be done.

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2. ~~B. Major~~ problems continue to exist in establishing intelligence requirements for certain collection systems because of the inter-relationship of data from a given system with other related systems bearing on a specific intelligence problem. For example, ELINT order of battle is based on photographic, ELINT and COMINT data. Requirements on each of several collectors must be framed in a fashion that considers this inter-relationship and therefore does not result in redundant collection by all but "shares the load" in the light of the capabilities of several collection systems. The SIGINT OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE SUB-COMMITTEE (SORS) of the SIGINT Committee has taken steps to consider other sources in the establishment of revised satellite collection requirements and has coordinated its actions with other appropriate USIB Committees. However, the large number of compartmented collection projects makes it difficult to obtain such an over-view, especially when one or more USIB or other committees are required to coordinate thereon.

# C. A perennial problem in the Intelligence Community has been the creation of an appropriate dialogue between the elements for development of collection systems and those responsible for the establishment of intelligence requirements. This problem is especially critical when expensive systems are involved. In this Agency the establishment of the DDS&T in 1963 recognized the desirability and need for promoting such a dialogue - but in the broader areas of the community - this problem has not been completely solved.

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During this past year the SORS and the NRO have initiated such a dialogue to obtain an assessment of the intelligence values involved in system design trade-offs that appear because of technical limitations or because of the cost factors. Two studies, which subsequently received USIB approval, were transmitted to the NRO.

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B. 3. Significant Gaps, Deficiencies and Undesirable Duplication of the Various US Intelligence Agencies.

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A. As gaps we would highlight: (1) Poor inter-agency access to raw and partly processed data, (2) Poor inter-agency dissemination of contractor finished reports, and (3) Poor feedback of technical intelligence data to US laboratories engaged in weapons and counter-weapon development programs.

Perhaps the greatest deficiency remains the gross imbalance between the huge fund expenditures for intelligence collection and the trickle spent for analysis. The S&T intelligence problems are becoming increasingly complex and require more elaborate analytical efforts to derive conclusions that will bear the scrutiny of increasingly concerned and perceptive consumers. Yet, it is still true that the bulk of the US intelligence dollars go into elaborate collection schemes while the amount allocated to new analytical resources, not merely to data reduction facilities, continues to decline. The propriety of perpetuating this pattern in the face of no foreseeable reduction in the demand for finished intelligence should be examined. The collection of vast quantities of raw data that cannot be converted in timely fashion to finished intelligence appears to be a wasteful principle at best.

(1) ~~1~~. The time required to process information at NSA and NPIC is still a problem of major concern to us. The perennial question of how much collation these two first echelon processors should attempt before release of data to the intelligence analysis community needs to be considered again. In some fields of advanced weapons intelligence we are still presented with year-old information despite persistent prodding.

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(2)  
c. A gradual decline in FTD capabilities appears to have occurred. A case in point is the slowness with which technical analyses, largely based on photography, on new Soviet aircraft are being furnished to the community.

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4. Specific Actions to Strengthen the Effectiveness of the Over-all Intelligence Effort.

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(2) B. Perhaps the single action which would serve to strengthen the over-all intelligence effort lies in giving to the DCI the power of unilateral review and veto of expenditures for collection, processing, or analysis by any agency of the intelligence community, with appeal only to the President.

2. In addition to the comments above, it seems appropriate to point out that in coordinating intelligence activities concerned

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with the analysis and production of S&T intelligence in such areas  
as atomic energy, BW/CW, air and naval weapons systems,  
military electronics, life sciences, and others, JAEIC and SIC  
generally have been successful in ascertaining that all critical  
subjects are covered by member Agencies and research conducted  
as appropriate.

CARL E. DUCKETT  
Deputy Director  
for  
Science and Technology

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